

Who is an Alien?: Reading Gandhi

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Gandhi remains controversial yet still demands reconsideration because he stands at the beginning of the long twentieth century and we stand at the other, implosive, end. The questions he asks about how imperial nations were being made and how free nations should be made remain unfinished -they are at the core of casteism, communalism and racism as a majoritarian state defines, deports, sequesters, ghettoizes, underclasses or eliminates so-called aliens. The techniques that were put in place at the turn of the twentieth century have intensified in the early twenty-first: state surveillance (now fusing with corporate digitalization); selectively restricted mobility inside and into the country; the cordoning of land and resources for the few (now under the aegis of state-supported neoliberal capitalism).

The four colonies of South Africa were not a single unit when Gandhi arrived. The formation of the Union of South Africa under the aegis of a racial nationalism was the arena in which many of Gandhi's resolutions and irresolutions took shape. I believe that in Gandhi's struggle with the burden of received colonial, legal, orientalist, racialized and patriarchal knowledge or vocabulary, the impasses and openings, the successes and failures are equally instructive when read as a series of resolved and unresolved contradictions.

Here I argue, in a synoptic sketch with little elaboration, that some of Gandhi's universalist positions emerge from: first, the long struggle for rights in South Africa and what he termed 'elementary equality' within the British empire; second, the analogies between empire and nation, the tensions between the national and the non-national as well as within definitions of civilisation; third, the incommensurability of the nation-form with indentured labour; fourth, the question of who within the British empire could be classified as an alien; and fifth, the contradictory emergence and containment of 'women' as a political entity.

In the campaigns for rights in South Africa, before and after writing *Hind Swaraj*, his understanding seems to be liberal, secular, pluralist and multireligious. There are few signs of an antimodern Gandhi in the early volumes of his collected works (my primary source). The antimodern formations that were crystallising in America and Britain occupied a somewhat slippery and indistinct ground. Left and socialist critique of imperialism, capitalism and the condition of workers could intersect with antimodern positions insofar as the term modernity was a synonym for the effects of the ongoing transitions to capitalism. Other affinities between the antimodern and socialism lay in the search for alternative, often pastoral lifestyles that could synchronize with a largely agrarian subcontinent and/or with communitarian alternatives to liberal, bourgeois or 'western' individualism.¹ This leads into another

question: should the civilisational opposition between east and west in *Hind Swaraj* be read as a decisive manifesto or understood as partly a flat rendition of anticapitalism, and partly as the play of unfolding contradictions?

Time and place

I focus on Gandhi in a specific conjuncture -1890's to 1910's -at the height of imperialism, the expansion of empire in Asia and Africa. Home Rule was becoming a common political horizon in the colonies. This was a period of major demographic outflows from Europe to the Americas, from Britain to white settler colonies which were becoming self-governing 'Dominions', and from one colony to another colony as indentured labour. The British empire was becoming converged, white

and coloured migration were perceived as competing: immigration to white settler colonies such as Canada, Australia and South Africa was being racialized, restricted and bureaucratized to ensure the privileges of white settlers and voluntary itinerant workers. Even as the transnational circulation of capital, gold, agricultural goods, resources, people and ideas accelerated and created networks of commerce, labour and communication, the singularity of territories, dominions and nations was claimed vociferously often through violent protectionist labour campaigns and new border controls. As in South Africa, borders were in the making within a putatively borderless British empire through a number of anti-Asiatic ordinances.³

Though Gandhi professed a loyalism and Home Rule was his horizon, he was developing a scalar and synchronic view of the intersecting materiality and contradictions of labour and capitalism in three countries, each in the grip of dislocating transitions and labour struggles. He was politicized within the material and ideological frictions between several modes of colonization indirect rule in chiefdoms of Kathiawar (Porbander and Rajkot), direct rule in presidency areas in India such as Bombay, Britain's informal trade empire and a settler colonialism in South Africa (especially Natal, a British protectorate and the Transvaal, a Boer and Afrikaner republic) -all manoeuvred from the metropolitan London he was familiar with.

Centred on colonial finance, commerce, retail markets and manufacture, the city of London functioned as an economic sign of capital and labour. As Britain became a shop for the empire's goods, the exotic images used to advertise products became part of shared visual culture extending consumption from commodities to their significations: imperial power, distant origins, and authority over alien labour. As the nucleus of imperial surveillance, London was a zone of control, classification, obsessive knowing, segregation of rich from poor, vivid stratifications of class, gender and race, i.e., as often noted, at once an 'exhibitionary complex', a degenerate, dark, orientalist and not-modern colony, an internal non-west and a microcosm of empire.⁴ At the same time, London was a politicizing and embattled site of working class militancy -dock workers strikes, trade union organisation -suffragette struggles for franchise, emergent feminism, and the place where social movements, dissenters and proto-nationalists from the colonies petitioned or demonstrated. Other than the protests of merchants, indentured labour, and Chinese workers in South Africa,⁵ Gandhi was also watching and learning from anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles especially for what could be emulated by Indians in South Africa: Turkey⁶ and Ireland⁷; the agitation for Home Rule in Egypt and Iran;⁸ Russia and the swadeshi movement impelled by the partition of Bengal,¹⁰ as well as the exemplary struggle of British suffragettes for political rights and legal equality inside Britain.

Rights in the British Empire

The Indian community in South Africa, Faisal Devji notes, was 'shaped entirely by capitalist relations, whether of commerce, service or labour, and had no dealings with premodern forms of possession or production'; consequently, unlike India, rights could be claimed more directly without invoking the safeguards or privileges of caste and religion. And further, in claiming rights, the question of commercial and labour migration was posed in imperial rather than national terms.¹¹ For Gandhi, rights for Indians were pinned to the idea of the 'British subject' since without it there would have been no 'state-aided immigration' to South Africa.¹² This *status* was important because Indians had no right to franchise, no other legal protection, no claim to being prior inhabitants like Africans, or to political sovereignty like the British.¹³ For Gandhi, the British subject, regardless of national

origin, had to be a portable status within the empire.¹⁴

Gandhi embarrasses the British by underscoring the universality of rights, *annexing* the professed liberal ideals of empire and holding it to its own principles. As Uday Mehta also notes, it was the ideal universality of the British empire that Gandhi found appealing and which allowed him to claim to be its loyal subject.¹⁵ Yet more than this, he asked for an internal transformation of empire. After the defeat of the South African deputation in London, in a farewell speech on 12 November 1909, Gandhi is reported to have said that: 'it was utterly impossible for him to give his allegiance to an Empire in which he was not to be treated, even in theory, as an equal of any other member of that Empire...if he was merely to be a slave, then the Empire [and] the term "British Subject" became meaningless to him'.¹⁶

As is well known, nationalist majoritarianism and xenophobia never had a place in Gandhi's thought. A nation was not synonymous with religion, race, colour or ethnicity. Less obvious is, first, his attempt to transform empire by reading it as non-national and thus potentially utopic and second, the emergence of a capacious notion of religious plurality and nationness from the inhospitable circuits of empire. A legal and ethical universalism, whether he termed it elementary equality, legal equality or civil rights emerges, in part, from the cultural heterogeneity catalysed or intensified by colonisation.

The massive migrations in this period created the material conditions for pluralism even as the nation as an imperial form consolidating in Britain and western Europe bred desires for a congruence between territory and culture. Gandhi recognized the religious plurality and cultural heterogeneity within the colonies -empire was creating new aggregations of people divided by origin, colour/race and nation -heterogeneities that could only be bound by a unified regime of rights. The 'equality of treatment in the eye of the law' is 'the only thing that binds the Empire together. Immediately the idea of legal inequality is introduced, you sap the foundation of the Empire'.¹⁷ Later, in a

letter to *The Times*, London, 5 November 1909, he wrote: 'The only possible justification for holding together the different communities of the Empire under the same Sovereignty is the fact of elementary equality....'¹⁸ The British empire

could respect and accommodate multiple religions and diverse cultures only if it provided elementary equality. Further, such heterogeneity demanded a *deliberated pluralism* that countered the actual discriminatory cultural differentiation employed by colonial states.

Gandhi's religious pluralism is shaped, at this juncture, as much from the social and political ground of South Africa as the affiliative densities of South Asian history. Religion enters the struggle seldom and always with non-exclusive meanings: for instance, in his insistence on Hindu-Muslim amity, the symbiotic invocation of 'Khuda-Ishwar', and the assertion of 'one Truth' and 'the same God over all'.¹⁹ He said in February 1909, as well as later in Hind Swaraj, that 'This is a fight on behalf of religion, that is, on behalf of the [universal] religion which underlies all religions'.²⁰ Ajay Skaria interprets this as 'the unrepresentable and inexpressible kernel that constitutes the condition of possibility for any religion and any conception of the ethical', i.e., satyagraha.²¹

Oddly enough, the empire is, in one sense, a precursor of the multireligious nation and surpasses it both legally and geographically since the heterogeneity enclosed in the British empire is

immense. Nations-to-be appear to be analogues of empire. An already multireligious India with a long history of in-migration is caught between the divisive effects of colonial rule and the heterogeneous constellations created through voluntary or enforced mobility, and thus is as much in need of elementary equality as South Africa.

Yet the empire was not quite non-national. In this period the British empire was becoming an increasingly visible symbol of 'national worth'.²² Gandhi

thus had to argue for both Indian and British national worth to push empire to maintain its principles. The empire went beyond the nation, yet the empire was an extension of the British nation, indeed the empire was *possessed* by a nation.

It is precisely these paradoxes that propel Gandhi's demands from the empire to turn into a preemptive critique of insular and racial nationalism. Racism seemed to intensify with the consolidation of dominions, nations and borders even in an era of mass migrations. In other words, from the grossness and ideological masquerades of empire, Gandhi stubbornly wrests a pluralist and utopic vision of equality. Self-government within empire becomes an ethical question and a test run for a future 'Dominion' (the status South Africa was claiming at this time) or nation state. He says '... even a self-governing colony, so long as it chooses to remain a part of the Empire, may not go so far as to degrade and ill-treat those whom it finds settled within its border on assumption of self-governing powers'.²³ On a similar note he declares, 'Natal enjoys swarajya, but we would say that, if we were to imitate Natal, swarajya would be no better than hell. [The Natal whites] tyrannize over the Kaffirs [a pejorative term used by the British for native South Africans], hound out the Indians, and in their blindness give free rein to selfishness'.²⁴

Universalization for Gandhi here, and later, had an *ethical charge*, an attempt to *overcome* intractable religious, race, caste or gender difference to create a place *without aliens*. He demands 'freedom from special legislation, and in an interview in 1908, he says there should be no differential legislation in a free and self-governed South Africa. Those domiciled in South Africa should form part of the future nation coming into being. A united South Africa (composed of four colonies) meant unification not only of the white races, but of all British subjects, whether coloured or white who had chosen South Africa as their permanent home'.²⁵ He was more utopic in a speech in May 1908 titled 'Are Asiatics and the coloured races a menace to empire?': 'If we look into the future, is it not a heritage we have to leave to posterity, that *all the different races* [in the world] commingle and produce a civilisation that perhaps the world has not yet seen?'.²⁶

Civilisation and the eligibility for rights

Yet the term civilisation needs to be unpacked since so much hinges on the ways in which it has been used. The Victorian hierarchy of civilisation rested on divisions of labour and eligibility for rights. In his first few years in South Africa, Gandhi presents Indophilic and Orientalist testimonials to prove Indian eligibility for franchise and other rights,²⁷ and also draws on the contemporary achievements of Indians to prove that they were not racial inferiors.²⁸ Thus the concept of civilisation seems to emerge initially not as antimodern but as a *prelude* to demanding civil rights.

There is, however, a tension between the universalism of rights and the rights-bearing individual and legal definitions of difference in South Africa imposed by the British and the Boers. Initially, Gandhi contests the stigma of racial inferiority by invoking the ancient and contemporary

civilisational record of India. Gradually, he widens the idea of civilisation to include British rulers and says that civilisational virtue should be possessed by the liberal empire as well and not just those it ruled. Here his argument is not on nationalist ground. Nation is not a synonym for civilisation.

The focus shifted again and became more universalist in a letter to *The Times* in August 1909 written to correct its misstatements: 'You say that "the British Indians claim on racial and intellectual grounds a position of superiority to the Native races of South Africa". I submit with due respect that we do not want to lay any such claim, nor, in my opinion, is it necessary to make these fine distinctions with reference to the enjoyment of elementary rights that every civilised man should possess in *civilised countries*'.²⁹ Gandhi is not using the idea of Indian civilisation as a racist measure to demote South Africans. On the contrary, he is enlarging the idea of 'civilised countries' as locales of legal rights for all, and this would include the British and the Boers. This suggests that civilisation should be an encompassing rather than exclusionary concept.

South African governments virtually dropped the language of liberalism. At this time, for whites a self-governing dominion *had* to exclude Asiatics, equal political rights had to be opposed in theory as well as in practice.³⁰

Gandhi was thus located within a much wider matrix where colonialism could be resisted in the name of universalism *and* particularist hierarchies could be (re)instated in the interests of self-differentiation. This was a tricky position because liberal ideals could be invoked in the claim to rights but the ground of eligibility for rights could be sought in civilisational and gendered hierarchies which undermined universalism, foreclosed class struggle and feminist disturbance, and could also have casteist entailments. Gandhi's deep immersion in the struggle for rights undercuts the antimodern potentials of civilisation claims. Further, the constant push towards a theoretical universalism of rights also undercuts civilisational entitlement even when he claims it -and for this reason it is hard to find an antimodern Gandhi in these years. The disparity between liberal ideals and the vivid denial of rights, the pointed exclusions, the dispossession, the violent formation of colonial nation states and the economic realities of imperialism could thus simultaneously *reproduce, destabilize or contradict* antimodern positions.

The labour form and the nation form

My next point is the contradiction between the labour form and the nation form. Ranabir Samaddar notes (too briefly) that the history of the nation-form alongside the extra-nationalist narrative of indentured labor show 'the permanent disjuncture between the history of the nation-form and that of the differentially constituted labour form.'³¹ After the manumission of slaves, the construction of railways, mining, and the colonial plantation economy appeared as the primary sites of mobile labour. This transit labour occupied a crucial place in primitive accumulation, capitalist production and the formation of populations that fell outside nation-centric histories. Samaddar's insight is important to my argument: separate understandings of Gandhi as a nationalist in-the-making and an expatriate speaking to or for the Indian diaspora are perhaps less useful than the world-historic emergence of the nation form and an extra-national (or, as I see it, often non-national) labour form which were entangled with each other, yet displayed significant material and ideological divergences. The nation form assumed territorial anchorage and consolidations of tethered peoples -in theory since there were always exclusions, while the labour form, predicated on untethering, was still marked by alien signs of colour and place/country of origin and so came with another set of exclusions. The colonized countries which imported or exported labour were not sovereign or consolidated nation-states but themselves conquered, and often, like the Caribbean, repopulated territories.

Whereas 'coolies' could be slotted into factories and plantations as 'nation-less wage labourers',³² the voluntary labourers and settlers who flowed out of the entrenched and competitive nation states of western Europe could assume a superior status and entitlements that devolved *from* their nationality.

In South Africa, Gandhi was thrown into the contradictions of the nation form and the extra-or non-national form of mobile labour. Further, as Irfan Habib emphasizes, unlike Europe, in the colonies the nation-form itself would have to carry the burden of anticolonialism.³³ The ensuing nationalism was not preconceived but seems to gather its intensity from the deficits of empire.

Gandhi pointed to the difficulty of indentured labour finding subsistence in India and argued for their ability to *choose* to stay in South Africa as productive members of a nation not theirs by origin but a part of empire. He did not frame this as either an autochthonous or nationalist question. However, eventually, as I will show, Gandhi could not suture this labour form with the nation-form.

The racial governance of labour which divided African and Asian workers in the colonies was hardly new, and designed to prevent potential alliances among them.³⁴ Gandhi is caught within divisive racial governance and the increasingly codified laws on migration, entry and residence. Soon after arriving in South Africa in 1893, he pointed out in a letter to Naoroji that South African governments racialized non-European indentured labour and the trend was to restrict the ability of end-of-term non-European migrants to compete politically and economically with European settlers by limiting their legal status and numbers to preserve the privileged position of whites.³⁵ He argues against the repatriation of indentured labour -that is, against *an alienness that cannot be overcome*. He does not privilege national location, and instead places subsistence and livelihood above nationality:

To bring a man here on starvation wages, to hold him under bondage, and when he shows the least signs of liberty, or, is in a position to live less miserably, to wish to send him back to his home where he would become comparatively a stranger and perhaps unable to earn a living, is hardly a mark of fair play or justice characteristic of the British nation'.³⁶ Later, in 1906, he argued that men who have given the best five years of their lives 'should be free to settle in the country and reap the reward of their services by following *any* honest occupation they may choose'.³⁷ The three-pound tax, which would be levied on indentured labour if they did not reindenture themselves when they completed their contract, blocked the transition from indentured labour to a place in civil society. Resisting the tax was not just about upward mobility for free Indians, but indexed distinctly 'modern' self-fashioning subjects involved in choice of profession and place of residence. Very significantly, indentured labour included a sizeable proportion of low castes and dalits.³⁸

Surprisingly, since we are accustomed to see Gandhi as obsessed with varna, which he often was, he argued on behalf of the indentured and free Indians in South Africa for the right to *give up* traditional/hereditary occupations and take up any other occupation or lifestyle, insisted on their right to ownership of land, housing, education, jobs, access to public places, and protection by the state against their economic, political, social (white) superiors. Similar demands were a part of lower caste struggles and movements in India at the time.³⁹

Gandhi had difficulty with bringing together all the varied constituencies in South Africa. For instance, he was unable to club merchants who were classified as 'free' Indians with indentured labour since free Indian immigration was a 'matter of Imperial policy' while indentured labour was a 'matter of contract and bargain' between two *governments*.⁴⁰ It is partly the type of provenance and jurisdiction within which different categories of people fell that made it impossible for Gandhi to aim

for a single, unified and large constituency into which all workers could come together. Effectively then, when Gandhi felt that his intervention would not succeed in reforming the conditions of indentured labour, he became increasingly inclined to ask for it to end.⁴¹

The solution to end indenture effects a concentration in or absorption back into nation-space, the nation becomes more a default position than actively chosen and crafted. The vexing question of extra- and non-national labour remains in one sense unresolved, and in another sense transcended in the positing of universals.

At one level, many questions of living and belonging in South Africa override national origin: compulsory registration and ten-finger printing; the ghettoisation of Indians effected through property laws; the obstruction of the rights of mobility and family reunion; the injustice of deportation for men 'to whom the Transvaal is their adopted home and India a foreign country for purposes of earning a livelihood'.⁴² The anti-Asiatic ordinance marks territorial borders and replicates them internally through surveillance, hierarchical stratification, segregation and differential exclusion. Gandhi's protests seem to be aimed at not allowing linguistic, social and juridical borders to build up *inside* South Africa and so degrade the terms and conditions of residence. Interestingly, Gandhi did not argue for millennial or national connection to a place. Among the rights he fought for were the patently non-national 'rights of domicile' and 'residence' for Indians, especially refugees, in South Africa,⁴³ which were quite different from, even contrary to the 'natural' rights that stem from birth.

At another level, the idea of 'national' struggle also begins to appear forcefully in 1909 when Lord Crewe and General Smuts absolutely refuse to put 'Asiatics in a position of equality with Europeans in respect of right to entry or otherwise'. Gandhi then asserts that he will carry on the fight against the Transvaal and Imperial governments and demonstrate 'that we have the *potentialities of nationhood* in us, the spirit that people aspiring to be a nation must possess'.⁴⁴ Though there are several prior references to India as a nation and to South Africa as the site of a small and symbolic experiment in achieving the unity of Indians,⁴⁵ now the nation appears as an *antiracial* category. He also casts this as 'a national struggle'⁴⁶ and India -the nation-to-be -becomes a guarantor of political representation and the horizon for rights: 'All of us are Indians, and are fighting for India'.⁴⁷ In sum, Gandhi is positing a non-national concept of rights flowing from empire and confronting anticolonial nation-making at the same time.

At a third level, Gandhi built on his understanding that the labour of Asians and Africans had made the empire what it was.⁴⁸ His response (which was to deepen and continue throughout his life) was to dignify and universalise menialised caste-based labour, manual labour, and artisanal labour, that is, he tried to turn the *underbelly* of colonial capitalism into a *resistant* form.

Cultural exceptionalism and the 'racial taint'

This was a racist conjuncture in turn-of-century India, South Africa and Britain. In India, the blatant European outcry against the Ilbert Bill appeared alongside a more insidious fusion of the social and biological through which caste was being racialised, most infamously in H.H. Risley's anthropometry. In South Africa, white settler racism coalesced in anti-Asian sentiments among the Dutch and the British. In Britain, sections of the working class, trade unionists surrendered to White Labourism which inextricably intermingled racism with the militant critique of exploitation.⁴⁹ With some exceptions, especially among Irish nationalists, British liberal, socialist, Fabian and radical

anticapitalist dissidents (along with some suffragettes) mostly subscribed to racial hierarchy filtered through evolutionary theory.⁵⁰

Racial London was a synoptic place for making *selves* and *others*. Numerous exhibitions sorted and labelled peoples, artefacts, animals and plants from colonial territories. One exhibition included a 'Kaffir Kraal' populated with 'savage South Africans.'⁵¹ Racial difference was the mesmeric language of legibility and eligibility and generated inverted and relayed racisms. A racialized concept of Indian cultural exceptionalism also entered some Indian political demands. Ironically, this concept matched the racialization it sought to resist. In the late-Victorian racial hierarchy of civilisations, Indians stood higher than native Africans.⁵² Like Naoroji, Gokhale and others, the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, formed to advance liberal reforms in Parliament, did not reject the hierarchy of races, merely refused to position Indians at the bottom. The BCINC took up discrimination against Gandhi, himself the object of racist violence, also carried some received racialization in the form of colonial stereotypes and pejorative terms. Over time, his views on race became self-contradictory and altered. Though, as often noted, his campaigns maintained a studied distance from native Africans, people of colour and other Asiatics,⁵⁴ paradoxically, South Africa was the place which politicised Gandhi on questions of race and the place where the unlearning of a received racist vocabulary began. Connections between white racism in South Africa and the practice of untouchability in India began to emerge for Gandhi, Ranade and Gokhale.⁵⁵ Gandhi's understanding was of racism as tactile and *aversive*, a practice parallel with polluting untouchability, and *synonymous* with white nationalism in South Africa.⁵⁶ He saw racism as a monolithisation of regions, countries, ethnic and religious groups; racialization as a process of restriction on upward mobility, ghettoisation, segregation and the enactment of separate laws. He argued that 'any exclusion law should not be racial but should be of a general character' and refused to accept 'the racial taint on the Statute-book'.⁵⁷ He did not, however, bring caste and race together as structural and systemic; nor did he align brahminic privilege or caste hierarchies with white racism and its fears of miscegnation, i.e., he resisted an aligned analytic that was within reach once he became aware of the similarities between the two. Later, varna (but not jati which he was willing to discard) became a blockage of precisely the equalities he demanded from the British empire; precisely a source of the birth-based discrimination he protested against in South Africa. This self-contradictory blockage in his understanding was to persist till the 1930s.

Gandhi is often critiqued, correctly, for not taking up racism against native Africans in his campaigns. In fact, Gandhi traversed a much wider field of differentiation in negotiating the multiplicity of legal and regulatory systems in the four South African colonies. The received vocabulary of cultural differentiation between Indians, 'Coloured people' and Asiatics was made on identitarian grounds imposed by South African laws. The distinctions between 'British Indians', other Asiatics and 'Coloured people' rested on *legalities* which established pointed distinctions of origin, religion, ethnicity and colour in South Africa. He reasoned in 1906 that because of different legal provenances and recourses it was good that British Indians had kept themselves distinct from other coloured communities in South Africa. They have 'much in common regarding their grievances, but they have little in common regarding the points of view from which each section can urge its claim'. Only the British Indians can support their claim with Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858. Some 'Coloured people' can claim full rights to property and movement in Orange River Colony, but British Indians have no footing there. Similarly, in the Transvaal, many sections of other 'Coloured people'

can own landed property but British Indians are debarred. In the Cape of Good Hope 'Coloured people' can exercise franchise but are disqualified if they move to Orange River or the Transvaal. So Indian and non-Indian organisations should, he felt, remain apart but 'give strength to each other in urging their common rights'.⁵⁸ 'Coloured people' seem to include Malays and mixed race persons but not native Africans; Gandhi felt that unlike Indians 'Coloured people' can argue that they are 'children of the soil', 'their way of life is entirely European', and also seek the help of Christian priests.⁵⁹ There is no moral judgement against colony-born, converted, inter-married and Europeanised Indians; rather, correctly or incorrectly, he saw the multiple divisions as difficult to reconcile. Further, he felt that Indians were singled out as special targets of the recent laws and ordinances and so needed special remedies.

Who is an alien?

Who then was an alien in South Africa? Gandhi points out that the Transvaal is 'only a colony by conquest, not by settlement, and it is the aliens [white conquerors] who are opposed to this honourable Indian community'.⁶⁰ In other words, he is arguing that there should be no difference between European, white British and Indian British subjects. Native South Africans for him are pre-conquest inhabitants and they have the uncontested right of birth and belonging. Aliens are *all* post-conquest populations - e.g., workers, merchants, prospectors, investors in mines - and *produced* by conquest. The more crucial distinctions were between alien and alien rather than between native South African and Indian -he singles out native Africans far less than is commonly believed. For instance, Gandhi points out that the descendants of the Dutch are excluded from the provisions of the new ordinance but not Indian children born in South Africa. Again, the ordinance affects Muslim subjects of the Sultan of Turkey but not the Christian subjects of the Sultan of Turkey.⁶¹ The new ordinance does not apply either to Malays and Chinese who have come as indentured labour or to native South Africans and Cape Boys.⁶² He worries, in somewhat patriarchal fashion, that if an Indian man married a Malay woman, his legal status would be lower than his wife.⁶³

In Gandhi's experience the contradiction that empire is caught in is the liberal claim to universality and the insulting *practice* of labeling Asiatics, especially Indians as 'aliens' in settler colonies. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain was inclined to support the exclusionary bills to prevent the 'influx of people alien in civilization, alien in religion, alien in customs'.⁶⁴ The *London Times* described Indians as men who 'come from another race, with other traditions, other creeds, and other complexions than our own'.⁶⁵

British and Boer settlers claimed the 'natural' rights of conquest rights inherited by them as descendants of conquerors. Gandhi counters the view that South Africa was 'won by European blood' and Indians are 'intruders' by saying that in that case Europeans from those countries that have not shed blood should also be denied all privileges in South Africa; English immigrants should not encroach on 'the special preserve' of the first white settlers (the Boers); and if shedding blood for 'Empire' is 'a criterion of merit' then Indians have done so for the British on many occasions.⁶⁶

Evidently, in the post-conquest population, the rulers were aliens too. So the question raised by the special tax on freed Indian settlers, also taken up in a local newspaper, which Gandhi cites, was: Who were the *real* aliens? *The Natal Advertiser* of 16 May 1895 lists 'members of other non-European races, who have no connection with the British Empire, such as Chinese, Arabs,

Kaffirs from outside States, and all such visitors.' The article asks, should they be allowed 'to settle with impunity, and without disability'?⁶⁷ Here it seems that people from outside the political and territorial boundaries of empire are the real aliens. On parallel lines and somewhat infected by a reverse demographic paranoia about Europeans, Gandhi says that immigrant whites in South Africa are largely aliens: 'Thousands of aliens of different races, such as Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, Russians, and Polish Jews, are entering the Transvaal without any molestation and without any restriction'.⁶⁸ He felt that since merchants and shopkeepers were often from southern Europe and Russia, imperial protection is unjustly being given to persons who are not British subjects.⁶⁹ This too becomes an imperial rather than national question. Whether European or non-European, aliens are cast as the constitutive outside of empire -they perform its boundary and, ironically, in doing so show the geographical limits of an empire that does not encompass the world.

As is visible here, there is a simultaneous pull towards the liberal potentials of the law for Gandhi and an ethically charged universalism which together explain his contradictions and ambiguities in South Africa. The universalisation he undertakes, transcends the racist and the religious particular; it allows for a pluralism, and in this case, a non-exclusivity, but unfortunately only within the boundaries of empire. The colonial contradiction between the abstract unmarked citizen and the marked citizen -white or coloured -meant that the abstract citizen, through whom egalitarian universals could be imagined, was always undercut by the marked population for whom these very restricted pathways had to be found. Gandhi did not fulfil all the promise of his ethical universalism -yet it did enlarge the capacity for self-reflection and inclusion as well as the ability to pose ethical questions.

The Native Land Act of 1913 made it illegal for native Africans to purchase or own land in nine-tenths of the entire Union of South Africa, and effectively turned the pre-conquest population to whom the land belonged by birth into aliens. Gandhi denounced this territorial segregation and blatant dispossession which became the material foundation of apartheid on 30 August 1913: 'Every other question, not excluding the Indian question, pales into insignificance before the great Native question'.⁷⁰ By this time South Africa had become relatively autonomous and the 'British subject' as a ground for rights had receded.

Hind Swaraj -an interlude or an antimodern manifesto?

I have time only to make some brief observations on *Hind Swaraj* written in 1909. There are two departures from the preceding years: much *more* political economy (albeit compressed in a few pages) and a very *garish* contrast of eastern and western civilisation. These departures seem to be the two poles of a contradiction given that civilisation carries antimodern elements but acquires new meanings, and that *Hind Swaraj* is *preceded* and *followed* by a renewed campaign for rights in South Africa. It seems to be an in-between text rather than starting a new chapter -perhaps that chapter was to begin in the satyagraha that followed.

Beneath the hyperbolic polarization of sovereign and subject, east and west, in *Hind Swaraj*, both west and east are subjugated by a subsuming entity, a structuring force that determines the 'condition' of England and *through* it of India.⁷¹ Gandhi opposes this mode of conduct (which he names western civilisation) resting on force through a classic litany of colonial expropriation: the destruction of local industry and expansion of markets,⁷² pendant on the speed and technological innovations which were impoverishing India,⁷³ the railways as the colonial apparatus of political and

military control

and the engine of economic extraction. This flattening indictment of colonial expansion, industrial capital, the exploitation of wage labour in colonies and metropole, the linking of colonialism and capitalism, and the obsession with profit is not too distant from Marx's more dialectical critique of the expansion of markets, the destruction of 'national industries' and the forcible introduction of 'what it [the bourgeoisie] calls civilisation', i.e., the 'bourgeois mode of production' on all nations which makes the 'East' dependent on the 'West'.⁷⁴

Though Gandhi's critique is blurred by an overblown antithesis of east and west, clearly Britain is controlled by something much larger and more powerful than itself, and India is being restructured by the same modalities. Despite the asymmetry of power, east and west are aligned in that both are governed by the apparatus of capitalism and the drive for accumulation. The British are subject to capitalism and Indians are subject to a subjected nation, that is, to Britain.

There is a decisive shift here in Gandhi's understanding of Britain and the empire. It is also significant that the idea of civilisation alters profoundly and acquires other layers of meaning. Whereas South Africa as a dominion or nation-in-the-making is not seen as building on a past but, ideally, on liberal principles, India is seen more as a continuity in *Hind Swaraj* and continuity is invoked as a barrier to capitalism. Civilisation as millennial depth offers a historical premodern with the capacity of resisting the modern, i.e., it stands on the cusp of the antimodern. Yet *Hind Swaraj* moves away from civilisation as a colonial metric or a racial ladder. Rather, civilisation defined as good conduct is, as Uday Mehta also points out, atemporal and transhistorical; it is universally available to all individuals as ethical self-making, and in this sense, any people can be or become civilised.⁷⁵

The insistence with which Gandhi raises the idea of the unjust state in *Hind Swaraj* is useful to remember and reiterate today. It makes a decisive shift in his language from the rights of conquest to the *earned* right of a sovereignty committed to the good of its subjects. This is no longer a loyalism, if it was ever simply that. The state must do its duty to earn its right to sovereignty: an unjust state not doing its duty can have no rights over its subjects. Obedience of unjust laws becomes contrary to dharma understood as ethical duty. The subject/citizen-to-be is *duty-bound* to be disloyal and disobedient to the laws of an extractive, coercive or evil state.⁷⁶ Duty/dharma functions as a broad critique of sovereignty and tyrannical rule.⁷⁷ Loyalty becomes conditional and the unjust sovereign becomes the real alien.

'Womanhood' and civil disobedience

Hind Swaraj wavers between an explicit anticapitalism and a redefined atemporal idea of civilisation grounded in continuity. Yet the antimodern is an unstable sign since Gandhi's own, equally compelling, confluences were with liberal, egalitarian and secular tendencies. After writing *Hind Swaraj*, he undertook the largest mobilisation for satyagraha in 1913 which positioned Indian workers and women as rights-bearing subjects. This is the moment when a regulatory notion of womanhood comes into being at the same time as 'women' as a political identity/entity - a contradiction that was to continue in subsequent decades. As I see it, Indian womanhood and sacralised marriage, which Gandhi believed were figures of cultural resistance, were formed at the heart of the contradiction between the nation form and the labour form. The emergence of these figures had been in the making for some time as women too were thrown into the extra-or non-national labour form as workers in transit, as indentured

labour.

With proletarianisation and the indentured labour market, marriage and family structures were in a state of flux that coincided neither with higher caste patriarchal practices in India nor with compelling Victorian ideals of companionate marriage. Women were also entering the industrial work force in Britain and India; families were separated through forced migration in the colonial labour economy; indenture was creating non-endogamous (intercaste, interregional and interreligious) marriages and non-marital households; and patriarchal practices were being challenged *and* reformulated in transnational contexts of caste mobility and class formation in South Africa. Unlike the Caribbean countries, fewer single women went to South Africa as indentured labour, and encouraged by the British government in India, men came more often with their wives. If married, indentured women could signal discomfiting changes within the institution of marriage overdetermined by class and caste; if escaping from a marriage, they could signify a latent critique of the institution.

The marriages of free Indians simmered and then erupted as a political issue in South Africa. Marriage laws denied spousal and residential belonging to Indian wives and created a new type of alien. In 1906 Gandhi had protested against the requirement of separate permits for wives travelling with their husbands and posited Indian couples as a single unit. He argued that Indian wives did not compete with whites since 'their work is confined solely to looking after their household', and that separate permits were an insult to 'Indian womanhood'.⁷⁸ In 1913 Hindu, Muslim and Zoroastrian marriages were invalidated in South African law which would recognise only monogamous weddings performed by judges, state officials and Christian clerics. This meant that in the eyes of the law all non-Christian Indian wives were living out of wedlock, their lawful children were illegitimate and could be deprived of their inheritance. Further, the state refused to classify *any* Hindu or Muslim marriage as monogamous since the rites were performed in India, and the country permitted polygamous marriages.⁷⁹ This law would prevent family reunion with wives and children and so push unindentured/free Indians either into leaving South Africa, or, undertaking farcical 'remarriages' and registration. Gandhi saw it as contrary to Indian civil and personal laws.⁸⁰ Detached from its habitual location in India, the marriage question became stark. Several Indian women from different regions, religions and castes jointly protested the de-recognition of their legal status as wives; some courted arrest and were imprisoned in the 1913 satyagraha, which asked for marriage laws to be amended, fused the claim to rights with religio-cultural self-differentiation, and acquired a defensively nationalist tenor.⁸¹

The 1913 satyagraha brought the demand for amendment of marriage laws together with protest against Natal's three-pound tax in a massive strike by Indian indentured labour. The strike included women whose marital status was unlikely to be endangered by the new law, though it is not clear how many were single or married, indentured or nonworking wives. However, they were located differently from the higher class, homebound and dependent married woman.

What is equally notable is that the *same* satyagraha was partly based on the militant tactics of British suffragettes such as civil disobedience; tax resistance; refusing to pay fines, courting arrest; demanding the status of political prisoners rather than criminals or living like common prisoners; hunger strikes in prison; publications, rallies, vigils and pickets. Gandhi had long upheld them as an exemplary model for Indian *men*, the more so because theirs was a coeval struggle for rights within the same empire and challenged the British government in its own 'home'.⁸² Suffragettes occupied

many different positions. They could be both nationalist and imperialist; seek the right to vote on the ground of women's service to nation and empire; seek a share in empire on the basis of social service and their reproductive roles; aim to reform empire or even strengthen its legitimacy. Yet Gandhi divided them into just two categories -moderate and extremist -he praised the tenacity, determination, courage, sacrifice of personal safety and possessions of the former and deplored the 'unruly methods' and violence of the latter.⁸³

In the conjunction of three groups of women, two proximate and one distant, each signaled dangerous ruptures. British suffragettes signified the subversion of conventional femininity and displayed women's capacity for violence. Indentured women stood within the colonial and capitalist path of proletarianization -formally contractual yet practically bonded -living in varied forms of cohabitation and marriage. Non-indentured and higher class married women, mostly positioned as non-earning dependents on husbands/family, now occupied the unprotected public spaces of satyagraha and prison. A large number of indentured men and women emerged in defense of non-national rights and opposed the three-pound tax which inhibited permanent settlement in South Africa, while a small number of higher class married women in the same campaign came out in defense of the legal legitimacy of marriage and invoked the honour of the nation. Though rights and honour were covalent here, it drew a tacit line between women inside and outside marriage -a line that was to become a fault line in Gandhi's views once he returned to India.⁸⁴

As disparate notions of labour and womanhood come into play, vanish or collide with each other in the 1913 satyagraha, women become a political force and entity and, at the same time, political self-determination is intertwined with moral and cultural differentiation based on ideal womanhood and marriage. I cannot go into openings and closures effected by the marriage and the labour question. Here I only note that after Gandhi returned to India, in speeches and writing till the 1920s, suffragettes were slotted as 'western' while Indian womanhood became an embodiment of an indigenist principle that was meant to challenge the very foundations upon which colonial authority, western materialism and degrading indentured labour were seen to be based. In a speech on 28 October 1915, he described indentured labour in general as semi-slavery and as 'capital ranged against labour with artificial props for capital and not labour'. However, indentured labour for women is represented mainly in extraeconomic terms as a conduit of sexual corruption. In the same speech Gandhi recycles the popular colonial stereotype of women in indenture as prone to sexual immorality, cohabitation without marriage, prostitution and fake marriage.⁸⁵ At the same time, within Gandhi's project, the universalised notion of Indian womanhood became a ground for desired social change including the abolition of indenture, the backbone of swadeshi (national self-reliance in manufacture and institutions) as an anticolonial gesture, an anticapitalist move towards economic self-sufficiency, and the space within which women's public participation was to be determined.

In conclusion

This talk has focused more on legal entitlement, but I will conclude more broadly. Gandhi's most consistent attempt -failed or successful, admirable or reprehensible, pertinent or misguided -was to enlarge, create and multiply, the *vectors of belonging in fissiparous times* through redefinitions of empire, nation, religion, civilisation, and the public political sphere.

The question of belonging is edging towards a nationalist shape.⁸⁶ *Hind Swaraj* signals that the nation was going to become a larger recourse than before. The non-national gets absorbed into the universalism of rights but also serves to define an antiracial, anticolonial, egalitarian nation. If, as *Hind Swaraj* suggests, empire and capital will have to be resisted through a nation state, how would

the nation be divested of its own inequalities of class, caste and gender? How many would be neglected or absorbed into the call for national unity? These too were volatile contradictions that Gandhi was to struggle with in later years.

His universalism, carries an ethical charge, yet is not always capacious. It encounters limits -in South African laws, in extant racism and civilizational rationales, in conservative notions of womanhood, in the gendered deficits of anticolonialism, in existing gendered nationalist paradigms -but is always contradictory, never seamless, always a struggle, sometimes failed, and often opening into new and creative pathways which need more attention than is possible today.

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Notes

- 1 In the 1890's, William Morris stood at this intersection and sought to combine socialism with his 'hatred of modern civilization' identified with industrial slavery and aesthetic impoverishment. He critiqued capitalism's unending creation of wasters and wretched workers' right to joyful and useful labour (cited in Lears, 1994: 62-63).
- 2 Bridge and Fedorowich, 2010: 149.

- 3 In north America too, the often violent protectionist labour campaigns against Chinese ‘coolies’ culminated in the Exclusion Act of 1882, and in subsequent decades were directed against Japanese and ‘new’ American workers who were seen as unfit for citizenship (Jacobson, 2000: 79-81, 86-87, 192-93).
- 4 Mitchell, 2002; Walkowitz, 1992; Marriott, 2003:176-81; Makdisi, 2014: xiv-xviii, 2, 201-22.
- 5 CW 6:459. Gandhi publicised the atrocities on Chinese miners and Indian indentured workers (CW 5:60-61; CW 7:42-43).
- 6 In Turkey’s conflict with Austria, Gandhi admires the Turkish boycott of Austrian goods and its struggle for national honour; he upholds it as a good example for Indians in the Transvaal (CW 9:178-9).
- 7 He writes on the Irish struggle for rights, their methods of passive resistance and their boycott of British goods, and says they should be emulated (CW 7:213-14).
- 8 CW 6:358; 7:6.
- 9 CW 7:6.
- 10 Gandhi notes the despotism of the Russian czar, expresses admiration for the workers’ declaration of a general strike, and says that this shows how ‘even the most powerful cannot rule without the co-operation of the ruled’. He points out the similarity between Russia and India where the power of the Viceroy is no less than that of the Czar, and so ‘we too can resort to the Russian remedy against tyranny’. He also sees the swadeshi movement in Bengal as much like the Russian movement (CW 5:131-32).
- 11 Devji, 2012: 50, 45.
- 12 CW 1:281. He wrote, the ‘Indian is in South Africa *because he is a British subject*’ (ibid. 1:281, my italics).
- 13 As P. K. Datta points out, the ‘imperial subject was a critical part of the political identity of the migrant Indian, given their small numbers, relatively uninfluential status and the escalating racist campaign they faced’. The ‘imperial subject’ was based on ‘the notion of separate nations which it was the obligation of imperialism to develop and also allowed a placeless loyalty within empire through which people located outside the originative space of their nation could claim a purchase on the land of their new habitation’ (Datta, 2011: 60,65).
- 14 CW 1:343. Gandhi said later that if the British government will not protect the millions of its subjects outside India, then Indians would not go to other British colonies (CW 6:213).
- 15 Mehta, 2009: 97. Or as Anil Bhatti put it after this talk, Gandhi wanted to elicit the non-parochial ‘surplus of empire’.
- 16 CW 9:542-43.
- 17 CW 9:30.
- 18 CW 9:516.
- 19 CW 5:50; 6:454; 7:339; 9:41; 7:306. 20 CW 9:198. 21 Skaria, 2016:15. 22 McClelland and Rose, 2006: 275.
- 23 CW 6:276-77.
- 24 CW 8:458.
- 25 CW 5: 151; 9:77.
- 26 CW 8:232-46, cited in Lelyveld, 2011: 60, my italics.
- 27 CW 1:150-57.
- 28 He uses contemporary examples to show that Indians are not racial inferiors, e.g., they are good soldiers, skilled traders, prize-winning university students; they have the capacity for ‘abstract thought and insight into the mystery of things’. The west only has military advantage but that will not last if Indians become agitators and begin to dislike ‘whiteman’s rule’ (CW 7:326-27). Indians

are as civilised as South African law-givers (CW 7:398) and will stay in the Transvaal only as 'free men and as equals in everyday affairs' (CW 7:401).

29 CW 9:372, my italics.

30 See Hunt, 1993: 46-47.

31 Samaddar, 2015:49-51.

32 Natarajan, 2013: 69-70.

33 The movement against colonial domination among the exploited and oppressed countries converted them into nations (Habib, 2017:4). In a lecture in this series, Irfan Habib also says that the concept of the nation as an independent political entity was confined to Europe -colonised countries were not thought of as nations through the 19th and early 20th century. In colonized countries 'nation' comes into being through anticolonial struggle and their nationalism was different from the nationalism of European countries: the country had to be united and without internal divisions. This concept of nation comes out of our own freedom struggle. The racist policy of South African regime was what unified all Indians in Gandhi's mind (Habib, 2018).

34 See Lowe, 2015: 1-42.

35 CW 1:129. The question of indentured labour in South Africa also exposed the different interests of British administration in India and in South Africa where they privileged the demands of white settler interests.

36 CW 1:161.

37 CW 5:318, my italics.

38 For estimated percentages, see Lelyveld 2011:25.

39 On contemporary lower caste struggles in India, see Aloysius, 2017: 163, 82-5. Though I cannot go into the implications here, in the 1920's Gandhi was quite explicit about the right of 'untouchables' in India to give up their old hereditary occupations (see Biswas, 2018:74).

40 CW 5:318.

41 In an appeal to India in August 1909, he describes the situation of British Indians in Natal: There are 10,000 traders and 90,000 Indians, either indentured or were indentured and are now free. Trade is being crushed, Indian labourers are worked almost as slaves, and when they finish indenture are taxed exorbitantly and thus prevented from settling in the colony as free men, and therefore there are no facilities for the education of future youth. Unless grievances are redressed the Indian government should stop the supply of indentured labour. Things have become much worse due to stringency of measures and remorseless enforcement; the means of subsistence have been curtailed, the 'existence' of Indians in the colony and the 'enjoyment even of the elementary rights of British citizenship is imperilled' (CW 9:372).

42 CW 7:469.

43 CW 6:455; 9:125.

44 CW 9:521-22, my italics.

45 For instance, CW 5:290.

46 CW 9:539.

47 CW 9:97. Initially for Gandhi in South Africa, rights do not need a spiritual validation but later he begins to refer to God as a higher authority than rulers/monarchs -not to restore a traditionalist order, rather to lower the status of earthly sovereigns.

48 See CW 8: 232-46, cited in Guha, 2014: loc 5670-87.

49 Hyslop, 2010: 255. In this period, notions of Britishness were critical to the labour racism of Britain, Australia and South Africa. British trade unionists demanded protection of white workers monopoly of skilled jobs against the competition of African and Asian labour and the exclusion of Chinese labour from mines in South Africa. The imposition of penal taxation against Chinese

- labour in Australia became a model for South Africa. British unionism was directly involved in creation of South African industrial segregation (ibid.: 256-66).
- 50 See Schneer, 2001: 164-71; Viswanathan, 1998: 196; Mayhall, 2000: 8.
- 51 Schneer, 2001: 94-95.
- 52 Schneer, 2001: 164-6. Civilizational scales, which placed Asiatics above Africans and native Americans, had been underconstruction through the 19th century and were now increasingly racialized.
- 53 Schneer, 2001: 164-65, 197.
- 54 Habib, 2011: 3-6; Hunt 1993: 52; Lelyveld, 2012: 54-61; Desai and Vahed, 2016: 42-44, 122-23.
- 55 Ranade drew a comparison between the treatment of depressed classes in India with the degradation of Indians in South Africa; and asked if those who tolerated the shameful treatment of low castes in India had the moral right to denounce South Africans (Mukherjee, 2016: 5; Guha, 2014: loc 2019-32).
- 56 Gandhi noted that ‘Europeans in the Johannesburg market seem to feel polluted by the touch of Indians. The Municipality, therefore, has resolved to have separate sections for the Europeans and for the black people.... Having a caste of untouchables in our own country, we have ourselves become untouchables here’. He advises Indian hawkers to resist since it would be better to leave the colony than stay on as ‘contemptible creatures for the sake of a living’ (CW 7:56). The equation of British racism and Indian casteism -the notion that all Indians were untouchable in British eyes -was to persist in Gandhi’s later years (Lelyveld, 2011:39, 42, 149.) During his jail term when he noticed some Hindus refusing to take food prepared by Muslims and ‘certain individuals’ but saw no objection raised if any white or native African touched the food, he wrote ‘Men who hold such views should never stir out of India’ (CW 9:180). He condemns the practice of untouchability in jail and said that all these were ‘false distinctions’ of caste and community and Indians in the movement should ‘resort to *satyagraha* against their caste and family’ too (CW 9:181). Later in 1931, he said that the segregation of Indians in British colonies was deserved since they segregated the ‘pariah’ at home (cited in Lelyveld, 2011: 42).
- 57 CW 9:108, 128.
- 58 CW 5:242. On Gandhi’s support of the struggle of Chinese indentured workers in South Africa while maintaining a distance on the ground of Indians being British subjects, see CW 7:397.
- 59 CW 5:243.
- 60 CW 6:116.
- 61 CW 6:212.
- 62 CW 6:384; 7:19.
- 63 CW 6.384; 7.17.
- 64 Cited in Guha, 2014: loc 2448-54.
- 65 Cited in Guha, 2014: loc 4272-75. 66 CW 1:275.
- 67 CW 1:221, my italics.
- 68 CW 6:212.
- 69 CW 6:213.
- 70 30 August 1913, Indian Opinion, cited in Lelyveld, 2011: 72.
- 71 Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 2015: 32. This emphasis on capitalism appears more sharply in two letters in the same year. He wrote to Polak that there is ‘no such thing as Western or European civilization’ -the dividing line is industrialisation and colonial profit (CW 9:477-81). He wrote to Lord Ampthill that the fault was not of the British people but of ‘the system’ and the exploitation of India in ‘the interests of foreign capitalists’ (CW 9:505).

- 72 He describes the East India Company as ‘versed alike in commerce and war’ and ‘unhampered by questions of morality’ (HS,39); ‘money is their God’ and ‘they [the British] wish to convert the whole world into a vast market for their goods’ (HS40).
- 73 Gandhi had written earlier, ‘India is a vast storehouse of wealth to Great Britain, while thousands of its inhabitants are dying of starvation with scarcely a murmur’ (CW 5:326).
- 74 Marx and Engels, 1978: 476-477.
- 75 Mehta, 2009: 110. 76 HS 2015: 112, 116. 77 HS 2015: 74-75, 92-93.
- 78 CW 5:237, 312-13, 450-52.
- 79 See CW 12:3, 19-21, 78-79, 124, 178-79, 224-30, 345-46, 402-04; Lelyveld, 2012: 107. This law was commonly seen as lowering the status of Indian wives to that of ‘concubinage’ (CW12:15, 225, 346).
- 80 CW 12:1-2.
- 81 CW 11:497-98; CW 12:65-66.
- 82 See CW 6:87, 335-36, 385; CW 7: 65, 73, 453; CW 9: 324-26, 339, 374, 488-89; CW 12:23.
- 83 CW 9:402, 447-48, 488-89, 525-26.
- 84 Gandhi’s idealization of women as morally superior subjects and marginal alteration of domestic roles have been thoroughly critiqued by feminists. See review in Hardiman, 2013:loc 1715-1981.
- 85 CW 13: 132. See also CW 13: 147, 248-49.
- 86 Defending non-cooperation, Gandhi wrote in a letter to Tagore: ‘I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any. I refuse to live in other people’s houses as an interloper, a beggar or a slave’ (CW 20: 158-59). The last sentence seems to refer to his petitionary visits to London and personal encounters with racist violence in South Africa.